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C yberatacks are increasingly threatening the safety of 
cyberspace, as underscored by the 
recent atacks on Sony Pictures, 
Anthem, and Home Depot, to name 
just a few. Although the most tangi-
ble consequence of the Sony atack 
was the leak of conidential infor-
mation, ranging from embarrassing 
email exchanges between Sony exec-
utives to copies of unreleased ilms,1 
it was more than just a data breach. 
Many stakeholders were afected, 
from the individual level to the orga-
nizational level and even the interna-
tional level, with the resulting strain 
between the US and North Korea.
More worrisome—even though 
it hasn’t been featured much in the 
media—is a recent cyberatack that 
caused physical damage to a steel 
mill in Germany.2 his atack echoes 
the well-known Stuxnet incident.3 
In this case, the atacker manipu-
lated and disrupted the mill’s con-
trol system, which prevented a blast 
furnace from being properly shut 
down and caused unspeciied dam-
age. his incident raises further 
concern that the growing popular-
ity of cyber-physical systems (espe-
cially in industrial control systems) 
could make society more vulner-
able to cyberatacks.
As society grows more de-
pendent on and intertwined 
with cyberspace, understanding 
and addressing various concerns 
regarding the human elements as-
sociated with cybercrime become 
more important.  
Cybercrime Stakeholders
Cybercrime can be simply deined as 
activities relating to the misuse of 
data, computers, information sys-
tems, and cyberspace for economic, 
personal, or psychological gain.4 
However, cybercrime is much more 
complex than this deinition sug-
gests. For one thing, the accuracy of 
reported losses due to cybercrime 
is oten arguable.5,6 Because there’s 
no authoritative body for reporting 
cybercrime, igures on losses are 
usually obtained from surveys, but 
mistakes and omissions are oten 
made in data collection and analy-
sis. Many other factors need to be 
considered, including the tools and 
methods used, cost and severity of 
the damage, atackers’ motives, and 
impact to individuals and society. 
Many stakeholders are involved 
with cybercrime. To allow for a 
meaningful discussion, we classify 
these stakeholders into three broad 
groups. Atackers are the crime’s per-
petrators, whose actions are consid-
ered harmful to other stakeholders 
and their systems and networks. 
Defenders aim to protect systems 
and prevent future atacks. In this 
article, we include investigators as a 
kind of defender. Investigators usu-
ally conduct an assessment ater an 
atack and collect evidence to deter-
mine the cause of the atack and the 
extent of the damage. Investigators 
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might take on the atacker role for 
undercover investigations, white hat 
penetration tests, and so on. Lastly, 
victims are the potential targets 
of cybercrime, whether intended 
or not. In many cases, stakehold-
ers might play the roles of both 
defender and victim, especially if 
they’re in charge of their own sys-
tems. Figure 1 shows how these 
stakeholders might interact.
We discussed the atacker role 
at length in Part 1 of this arti-
cle, which was published in the 
January/ February 2015 issue of 
IEEE Security & Privacy.4 To com-
plete the discussion, we now look 
at the other two key stakeholders: 
defenders and victims.
Defenders
Defenders protect against cyber-
atacks that might be directed at 
them, their organization, or their 
clients and try to keep their assets 
or reputation from being impaired. 
Defenders could be considered an 
adversary of atackers: they’re on 
opposite sides of the fence, and each 
side tries to prevent the other from 
achieving its goals.
As we did with atackers, we 
delve into defender characteristics 
by addressing the “what,” “why,” 
and “how.” To avoid repeating our-
selves, we highlight only a few key 
characteristics that need further 
discussion or are signiicantly dif-
ferent from atacker characteristics. 
Figure 2 shows a representation of 
defender characteristics.
Defending Motives
hree main motives behind a 
defender’s actions are
 ■ asset protection—protecting ac-
counts, processes, data, and other 
important information from un-
authorized access;
 ■ reputation protection—protect-
ing more intangible properties 
such as societal status, market val-
ues, and consumer trust; and
 ■ future atack prevention— inding 
ways to improve protection mecha-
nisms and bring atackers to justice. 
Asset and reputation protection 
play a big role in motivating defenders 
to prevent cybercrime incidents. he 
higher the stakes, the bigger the efort 
defenders need to make. Future atack 
prevention is relevant to the defender 
role as an investigator. By identi-
fying and neutralizing the biggest 
 ofenders—such as the world’s most 
proliic spammer7—we can expect a 
substantial reduction of the threat 
until the next generation of atackers 
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Figure 1. Cybercrime stakeholder interactions. A computer or network typically sits between 
attackers and victims and—where applicable—defenders, representing the “cyber” element of 
cybercrime. Victims might have some assets that attackers are attracted to, but this isn’t always the 
case. Defenders could be seen as entities associated with the entry point of an attack but might 
interact directly with victims and attackers in a noncyber environment (for example, a criminal 












Figure 2. Defender characteristics. Defenders aim to prevent attackers from stealing resources or 
causing damage and, where possible, identify attackers and bring them to justice.
Defender
Defending motives Defending tools Vulnerability avoidance
• Protection of asset
• Protection of reputation
• Prevention of future attack
• Information exchange portal
• Protection software




• Implementation vulnerabilities 
• Conﬁguration vulnerabilities
emerges. he ight against cyber-
crime will continue to be a constant 
batle, and there will be enormous 
costs associated with defending and 
preventing cyberatacks— much 
bigger than the losses caused by the 
atack itself.5  
Defending Tools
Defending tools are those that pre-
vent computers or networks from 
being atacked, minimizing the 
damage or even ighting back. 
Information exchange portals—
such as online forums for sharing 
insights, techniques, and knowl-
edge as well as more dedicated sites 
hosted by organizations such as the 
Computer Emergency Response 
Team Coordination Center—can 
help defenders ind the information 
they need to respond to an atack. 
Other users might have experienced 
a similar atack in the past or might 
have compiled a list of countermea-
sures or remedial actions that could 
help defenders. 
Protection sotware such as anti-
virus or malware removal kits can 
be used to detect, prevent, dis-
arm, or remove malicious sot-
ware. here are many vendors of 
such tools, and the quality of these 
products varies considerably, so it’s 
important to choose products from 
reputable companies. Furthermore, 
some protection sotware claims to 
ix problems caused by viruses but 
actually install their own malware 
on the target system.
Many network management and 
monitoring tools let users observe 
and control incoming and outgo-
ing network traic. heir functions 
include but aren’t limited to ire-
walls, intrusion detection systems 
(IDSs), packet snifers, traic moni-
tors, getaways, and proxy servers. 
hese can help defenders detect 
potential threats early and help 
investigators trace the source of an 
atack or build an atacker’s proile.
To add an extra layer of protec-
tion, encryption tools and techniques 
can be used to prevent private data 
from being leaked through a secu-
rity breach. At the very least, they 
can make it harder for atackers to 
get to the information. 
Finally, forensic tools such as com-
puter investigation and data recov-
ery tools are of growing importance. 
hese tools let investigators ind evi-
dence let by atackers. 
Vulnerability Avoidance
Just as atackers have a propensity 
to identify existing vulnerabilities 
in a system, defenders also need to 
identify potential system vulner-
abilities. Whereas atackers aim 
to exploit these vulnerabilities to 
commit a cybercrime, defenders 
endeavor to identify and patch 
these vulnerabilities before atack-
ers can ind them.
As we discussed in Part 1 of 
this article, three types of vulner-
abilities must be considered. Design 
vulnerabilities are inherent in a sys-
tem’s design or speciication; even 
a perfect system implementation 
will result in these vulnerabilities. 
Defenders use techniques such as 
formal methods to eliminate these 
vulnerabilities or techniques like 
fault tolerance to provide a graceful 
way to deal with such laws. If sys-
tem failure is unavoidable, the sys-
tem will fail in a controlled manner 
so that damage or information leaks 
can be prevented or minimized.
Implementation  vulnerabilities re-
sult from errors made in the sotware 
or hardware implementation of a 
design. Defenders can minimize im-
plementation vulnerabilities using 
methods such as penetration test-
ing, system testing, and a hardening 
 policy—a checklist to help ensure 
that all computers are installed with 
the appropriate security measures.
Finally, coniguration vulnerabili-
ties result from system conigura-
tion errors. Defenders can protect 
against these using system valida-
tion and veriication as well as pen-
etration testing.
Victims
Victims are the targets of cyber-
crime atacks, intended or other-
wise. Again, in many circumstances, 
victims are closely related to 
defenders. In an atack on an indi-
vidual, the defender is likely to be 
the victim as well. In this sense, vic-
tims inherit many characteristics 
of defenders. However, as Figure 3 
shows, three additional factors con-
tribute to victims’ characteristics: 
awareness and proiciency levels, 
atractiveness level and impact and 
cost to a victim.
Awareness and 
Proficiency Levels
Many cybercrime incidents occur 
because of victims’ lack of aware-
ness of security threats or low pro-
iciency with regard to their ability 
to protect against these threats. 
Logically, those with very limited 
awareness of or knowledge about 
computer security oten fall prey 
to atacks, whereas those with high 
knowledge and strong abilities 
might be able to resist or defend 
against atacks. However, very 
knowledgeable individuals or orga-
nizations can still become victims, 
oten as a result of identity thet, 
insider threat, or cyberwarfare. 
Attractiveness Level
Atractiveness level is mainly asso-
ciated with a victim’s assets, which 
can include inances, computing 
resources, or even a societal reputa-
tion. he more atractive the social 
proile or assets of an intended vic-
tim, the more atractive the victim 
becomes to atackers. Atractiveness 
level also relates to protection mech-
anisms. Atackers tend to go for easy 
targets irst, especially if there’s a 
smaller chance of detection. Wide-
open networks or unpatched com-
puters without irewalls or IDSs are 
examples of low-hanging fruit that 
atackers would exploit irst.
Nonetheless, a victim’s atrac-
tiveness is in the eye of the beholder. 
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It’s not easy to determine why vic-
tims become targets as this depends 
on a range factors, including the 
value of victims to atackers, vic-
tims’ ability to defend themselves, 
and the ease of the atack. Further-
more, some victims such as banks 
are atractive to many atackers, 
whereas others such as Sony Pic-
tures have a very limited or niche set 
of potential atackers. 
Impact and Cost to Victim
he impact and cost to a victim tends 
to be proportionate to the victim’s 
atractiveness level. hese costs can 
be divided into ive main categories:
 ■ inancial—money might be dis-
creetly taken out of a victim’s bank 
account or inadvertently trans-
ferred by a victim to an atacker 
through an online scam;
 ■ reputation—a victim’s reputation 
could be tarnished, leading to 
market value losses;
 ■ disruption of process—online ser-
vices or critical infrastructures 
could be disrupted;
 ■ psychological—a victim can sufer 
from trust issues, anger, depres-
sion, or even fear for his or her 
safety; and
 ■ physical—some atacks can cause 
physical harm, such as the nuclear 
centrifuges damaged by Stuxnet. 
Lessons Learned  
and Recommendations 
he best way to combat cybercrime 
is to understand it in detail, start-
ing with the stakeholders involved. 
In many cases, preventive measures 
are relatively inexpensive and easy 
to implement. Users need to take 
steps to avoid becoming victims to 
cybercrime, and governments and 
industry need to be proactive in 
anticipating new threats.
We’re still very ineicient at 
ighting cybercrime.5 he costs of 
anticipating and preventing cyber-
crime, such as purchasing antivirus 
sotware and carrying out extensive 
penetration testing, are oten much 
higher than the monetary losses 
caused by cybercrime. Further-
more, indirect costs, such as losses 
due to investigations and the inter-
ruption of service as well as psy-
chological and emotional harm, 
tend to be disproportionately larger 
than direct costs. A more eicient 
approach in tackling cybercrime 
could include dealing directly with 
atackers by identifying and arrest-
ing them. 
Emerging work in proiling 
potential victims could have a posi-
tive impact.5 Being able to iden-
tify risk factors associated with a 
certain stakeholder—for exam-
ple, an industrial control system 
operator— will enable a more efec-
tive set of detection, prevention, 
and protection measures for secur-
ing the stakeholder’s assets or at 
least for mitigating and controlling 
the potential risk. 
On an individual level, cer-
tain human traits—such as eager-
ness to please or willingness to 
trust others—make some people 
more susceptible to being a vic-
tim than others. here are many 
ways to proile potential victims: 
Olivier honnard and his col-
leagues used statistical techniques 
adapted from epidemiology to 
carry out a case control study that 
determines organizations’ risk fac-
tors.8 hey found that the larger 
the organization, the more likely it 
is to be afected by a targeted spear- 
phishing email atack. It might seem 
intuitive to assume that some sec-
tors like defense, critical infrastruc-
ture, or banking would be prime 
targets for an atack, but there are 
still many unknowns that need fur-
ther substantiation. Understanding 
why and how some organizations 
or individuals are more likely to 
become victims is a complex issue. 
he good news is that govern-
ments are beginning to pay more 
atention to cybercrime. For exam-
ple, the Australian government 
developed its national plan to com-
bat cybercrime in 2013. he plan 
outlines a framework in which the 
government will approach cyber-
crime using four key principles:9
 ■ Understanding the problem. Iden-
tify the victims, how and why 
they were atacked, how the 
atack was carried out, who the 
perpetrators are, and how much 
harm was caused.  
 ■ Partnerships and shared responsibil-
ity. Tackling cybercrime is a shared 
responsibility among individuals, 
industry, and government.
 ■ Focusing on prevention. It’s bet-
ter to prevent cybercrime from 
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Figure 3. Victim characteristics. here are many diferent types of victims, ranging 
from individuals falling prey to Internet scams to nation-states being subjected 
to cyberattacks. he severity of the damage sufered by victims also varies 
considerably. his diagram provides a simpliied view of victims’ characteristics; 
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happening than to respond to it 
ater it’s occurred. 
 ■ Balancing security, reedom, and 
privacy. Although it’s important 
to uphold individuals’ right to 
privacy, we also need to minimize 
the risk of security solutions being 
misused for cybercrime.
Armed with these principles, 
governments can shape policy 
and beter allocate resources, and 
businesses and individuals can 
make informed decisions when 
assessing risks and taking protec-
tive action. Governments need to 
explore partnership arrangements, 
including with law enforcement 
agencies around the world; the 
education sector; and industry sec-
tors such as Internet service provid-
ers, cloud services, e-banking, and 
online retail. Governments must 
take the lead on this mater, using 
their authority to highlight the 
importance of learning more about 
cybercrime to be able to prevent 
and defend against it efectively. 
Atackers must also understand and 
believe that they aren’t untouch-
able and that they will be identiied, 
arrested, and punished according to 
their crime. 
C ybercrime is a worldwide issue. Various organizations, 
including governments, industry, 
research, and education institutions, 
will need to work together closely 
to construct a coherent strategy to 
combat cybercrime. his can be 
done through analyzing atack types, 
methods, and costs that span many 
sectors and multiple countries. 
In the ight against cybercrime, 
teamwork is one of the keys to suc-
cess. We need to implement proac-
tive information and intelligence 
sharing among countries. We also 
need to develop a policy so that 
organizations can report cyber-
crime incidents to a regulatory 
body, which will result in precise 
statistics that can be shared across 
the globe. In certain countries, 
law enforcement’s power to indict 
atackers isn’t as strong as it could 
be, creating a gap in the prosecu-
tion of cybercrime ofenders. For 
example, people who are indicted in 
one country might be able to hide in 
another country with a low enforce-
ment level. It’s crucial that govern-
ments take serious action to close 
this loophole.
Although it’s projected that 
cyberthreats will continue to rise, 
raising cybercrime awareness will 
help combat this issue. Fighting 
cybercrime is an ongoing efort, 
and this article only scratches the 
surface. Further research on inter-
disciplinary perspectives of cyber-
crime is needed. We plan to delve 
deeper into policing cybercrime 
and its associated metrics, such as 
the cost of policing tasks and sta-
tistics of cybercrime in the public 
sector, as well as to explore other 
issues in human behavior and legal 
framework. Cybercrime can’t be 
addressed with technical solutions 
alone, no mater how good security 
measures are. We also need to seri-
ously consider the human factors 
that are involved. 
References
1. “he Interview: A Guide to the 
Cyber Atack on Hollywood,” BBC 
News, 29 Dec. 2014; www.bbc 
.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts 
-30512032.
2. K. Zeter, “A Cyberatack Has 
Caused Conirmed Physical Dam-
age for the Second Time Ever,” 
Wired, 8 Jan. 2015; www.wired 
.com/2015/01/german-steel-mill 
-hack-destruction.
3. D. Kushner, “he Real Story of Stux-
net,” IEEE Spectrum, 26 Feb. 2013; 
htp://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom 
/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet.
4. B. Arief, M.A. Bin Adzmi, and T. 
Gross, “Understanding Cybercrime 
from Its Stakeholders’ Perspectives: 
Part 1—Atackers,” IEEE Security & 
Privacy, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 71–76.
5. R. Anderson et al., “Measuring the 
Cost of Cybercrime,” Proc. Work-
shop Economics of Information Secu-
rity and Privacy (WEIS 12), 2012, 
pp. 265–300.
6. D. Florencio and C. Herley, “Sex, 
Lies and Cyber-Crime Surveys,” 
Economics of Information Security 
and Privacy III, Bruce Schneier, ed., 
Springer, 2013, pp. 35–53.
7. “Spammer Arrested and Charged 
with Fraud,” New York Times, Jun. 
2007; www.nytimes.com/2007/06 
/01/us/01spam.html. 
8. O. honnard et al., “Are You at 
Risk? Proiling Organizations and 
Individuals Subject to Targeted 
Atacks,” to be published in Proc. 
19th Int’l Conf. Financial Cryptog-
raphy and Data Security, 2015; 
htp://fc15.ifca.ai/preproceedings 
/paper_57.pdf. 
9. “National Plan to Combat Cyber-
crime,” Atorney General’s Dept. 
of Australia, 2013; www.ag.gov 
.au/CrimeAndCorruption/Cyber 
crime/Documents/National%20
P l a n % 2 0 t o % 2 0 C o m b a t % 2 0 
Cybercrime.pdf.
Budi Arief is a senior research asso-
ciate in the School of Computing 
Science at Newcastle University, 
England. Contact him at budi.
arief@newcastle.ac.uk.
Mohd Azeem Bin Adzmi is a con-
sultant focusing on IT strat-
egy in Malaysia. Contact him at 
azeemadzmi@gmail.com.
Selected CS articles and columns 
are also available for ree at 
htp://ComputingNow.computer.org.
88 IEEE Security & Privacy March/April 2015
BASIC TRAINING
Got an idea for a future article?
Email editors Richard Ford (rford@
se.it.edu) and Deborah A. Frincke 
(debfrincke@gmail.com).
